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Abstract. Following the publication of an attack on genome-wide as-
sociation studies (GWAS) data proposed by Homer et al., considerable
attention has been given to developing methods for releasing GWAS data
in a privacy-preserving way. Here, we develop an end-to-end differentially
private method for solving regression problems with convex penalty func-
tions and selecting the penalty parameters by cross-validation. In par-
ticular, we focus on penalized logistic regression with elastic-net regular-
ization, a method widely used to in GWAS analyses to identify disease-
causing genes. We show how a differentially private procedure for penal-
ized logistic regression with elastic-net regularization can be applied to
the analysis of GWAS data and evaluate our method’s performance.
Keywords: differential privacy; genome-wide association studies (GWAS);
logistic regression; elastic-net; ridge regression; lasso; cross-validation;
single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP).
1 Introduction
1.1 Genetic data privacy background
The goal of a genome-wide association study (GWAS) is to identify ge-
netic variations associated with a disease. Typical GWAS databases con-
tain information on hundreds of thousands of single nucleotide polymor-
phisms (SNPs) from thousands of individuals. The aim of GWAS is to
find associations between SNPs and a certain phenotype, such as a dis-
ease. A particular phenotype is usually the result of complex relationships
between multiple SNPs, making GWAS a very high-dimensional problem.
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Recently, penalized regression approaches have been applied to GWAS
to overcome the challenges caused by the high-dimensional nature of the
data. A popular approach consists of a two-step procedure. In the first
step, all SNPs are screened and a subset is selected based on a simple
χ2-test for association between each single SNP and the phenotype. In
the second step, the selected subset of SNPs is tested for multiple-SNP
association using penalized logistic regression. Elastic-net regularization,
which imposes a combination of `1 and ridge penalties, has been shown
to be a competitive method for GWAS (e.g. [1, 2]).
For many years, researchers believed that releasing statistics of SNPs
aggregated from thousands of individuals would not compromise the par-
ticipants’ privacy. Such a belief came under challenge with the publica-
tion of an attack proposed by Homer et al. [3]. This publication drew
widespread attention. As a consequence, NIH removed all aggregate SNP
data from open-access databases [4, 5] and instituted an elaborate ap-
proval process for gaining access to aggregate genetic data. This NIH
action in turn spurred interest in the development of methods for confi-
dentiality protection of GWAS databases.
1.2 Differentially private methods for solving regression
problems
The approach of differential privacy, introduced by the cryptographic
community (e.g. Dwork et al. [6]), provides privacy guarantees that pro-
tect GWAS databases against arbitrary external information. Building
on such notion, Uhler et al. [7], Johnson and Shmatikov [8], Yu et al. [9]
proposed new methods for selecting a subset of SNPs in a differentially-
private manner. These approaches enable us to perform the first step in
the two-step procedure for identifying the relevant SNPs in a GWAS with-
out compromising the study participants’ privacy. The second step of the
two-step procedure would involve performing penalized logistic regression
with elastic-net regularization (l1 and l2 penalties) on the selected subset
of SNPs in a differentially private manner. Kifer et al. [10] proposed an
objective function perturbation mechanism that releases the coefficients
of a convex risk minimization problem with convex penalties and satisfies
differential privacy. We can use this method to perform logistic regression
with elastic-net regularization in a differentially private way.
The performance of penalized logistic regression approaches depends
heavily on the choice of regularization parameters. Selection of these regu-
larization parameters is usually done via cross-validation. Chaudhuri and
Vinterbo [11] proposed a differentially-private procedure for choosing the
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regularization parameters based on a stability argument. However, the
method proposed by Chaudhuri and Vinterbo [11] only works on differ-
entiable penalty functions, such as the `2 penalty, and it cannot be applied
to elastic-net regularization or lasso.
In Section 2, we extend the stability-based method for selecting the
regularization parameters developed by Chaudhuri and Vinterbo [11] so
that it is applicable to any convex penalty function, including the elastic-
net penalty. By combining this new result and the objective function per-
turbation mechanism proposed by Kifer et al. [10], we are able to carry out
a privacy-preserving penalized logistic regression analysis. In Section 3,
we demonstrate how to implement the full objective function perturba-
tion mechanism with cross-validation based on the results by Chaudhuri
et al. [12] and Kifer et al. [10]. In particular, we provide the exact form
of the random noise used in the objective function perturbation mecha-
nism. Furthermore, we show that, under a slightly stronger condition, we
can perturb the objective function by an alternative form of noise—the
multivariate Laplace noise—and thereby obtain more accurate results. In
Section 4, we show how to apply our results to develop an end-to-end
differentially private penalized logistic regression method with elastic-net
penalty and cross-validation for the selection of the penalty parameters.
Finally, in Section 5, we demonstrate how well this end-to-end differen-
tially private method performs on a GWAS data set.
2 Differentially-private penalized regression
We start by reviewing the concept of differential privacy. Let D denote
the set of all data sets. Let D,D′ ∈ D denote two data sets that differ in
one individual only. We denote this by D ∼ D′.
Definition 1 (differential privacy). A randomized mechanism K is -
differentially private if, for all D ∼ D′ and for any measurable set S ⊂ R,
P(K(D) ∈ S)
P(K(D′) ∈ S) ≤ e
.
K is (, δ)-differentially private if, for all D ∼ D′ and for any measurable
set S ⊂ R,
P(K(D) ∈ S) ≤ eP(K(D′) ∈ S) + δ.
Let l : Rs ×D → R denote the loss function, r : Rs → R a regulariza-
tion function, and h : Rs × D → R the validation function. Let T ∈ Dn
be a training data set of size n drawn from D and V ∈ Dm a validation
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data set of size m also drawn from D. Let b ∈ Rs denote the noise used to
perturb the regularized loss function. Then we denote by T (λ, ;T, l, r, b)
the differentially private procedure to produce parameter estimates from
the training data T given the regularization parameter λ, the privacy
budget  > 0, the loss function l, the regularization function r, and the
random noise b. We score a vector of regression coefficients resulting from
the random procedure T (λ, ;T, l, r, b) using the validation data V and
the validation score function q(θ, V ) = − 1m
∑
d∈V h(θ; d).
Definition 2 ((β1, β2, δ)-stability. Chaudhuri and Vinterbo [11]).
A validation score function q is said to be (β1, β2, δ)-stable with respect
to a training procedure T , the candidate regularization parameters Λ, and
the privacy budget , if there exists E ⊂ Rs such that P(b ∈ E) ≥ 1 − δ,
and when b ∈ E, the following conditions hold:
1. Training stability: for all λ ∈ Λ, for all validation data sets V ∈
Dm, and all training dataset T, T ′ ∈ Dn with T ∼ T ′,
| q(T (λ, ;T, l, r, b), V )− q(T (λ, ;T ′, l, r, b), V ) | ≤ β1
n
.
2. Validation stability: for all λ ∈ Λ, for all training data sets T ∈ Dn,
and all validation data sets V, V ′ ∈ Dm with V ∼ V ′,
| q(T (λ, ;T, l, r, b), V )− q(T (λ, ;T, l, r, b), V ′) | ≤ β2
m
.
Chaudhuri and Vinterbo [11] gave conditions under which a valida-
tion score function is (β1, β2, δ)-stable when the regularization function
is differentiable and showed that as long as the validation score function
q is (β1, β2, δ)-stable for some β1, β2, δ > 0 with respect to the procedure
T , candidate regularization parameters Λ, and privacy budget , we can
choose the best regularization parameter in a differentially private man-
ner using Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 in Chaudhuri and Vinterbo [11].
In Theorem 3, we specify the conditions under which a validation score
function is (β1, β2, δ)-stable for a general convex regularization function.
In the following, we combine the regularization function and the reg-
ularization parameters to form a vector of candidate regularization func-
tions r = (r1, . . . , rt). Then, selecting the regularization parameters is
equivalent to selecting a linear combination of ri’s in r.
Theorem 3. Let r = (r1, . . . , rt) be a vector of convex regularization
functions with ri : Rs → R that are minimized at 0. Let Λ = {λ1, . . . , λk}
be a collection of regularization vectors, where λi is a t-dimensional vector
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of 0’s and 1’s. We denote by cmin := supc{∀λ ∈ Λ, λT r is c-strong convex}.
Let h(θ; d) be a validation score that is non-negative and κ-Lipschitz
in θ. We denote maxd∈D,θ∈Rs h(θ; d) by h∗. In addition, let l(θ; d) be a
convex loss function that is γ-Lipschitz in θ. Finally, let ξ ∈ R such
that P(‖b‖2 > ξ) ≤ δ/k for some δ ∈ (0, 1). Then the validation score
q(θ, V ) = − 1m
∑
d∈V
h(θ; d) is (β1, β2, δ/k)-stable with respect to T ,  and
Λ, where
T (λ, ;T, l, r, b) := arg min
θ
L(θ;λ, ),
with
L(θ;λ, ) =
1
n
∑
d∈T
l(θ; d) + λT r(θ) +
max{0, c∗ − cmin}
2
‖θ‖22 +
ϕ
n
bT θ,
β1 =
2γκ
max{c∗, cmin} , β2 = min
{
h∗,
κ
max{c∗, cmin}
(
γ +
ϕξ
n
)}
.
Proof. See A.1. uunionsq
Note that choosing r(θ) =
(
λ1
2 ‖θ‖22 , . . . , λk2 ‖θ‖22
)
, with Λ = {e1, . . . , ek},
where ei is a k-dimensional vector that is 1 in the ith entry and 0 every-
where else, results in Theorem 4 in Chaudhuri and Vinterbo [11]. Thus,
Theorem 3 generalizes Theorem 4 in Chaudhuri and Vinterbo [11].
The term max{0, c
∗−cmin}
2 ‖θ‖22 in Theorem 3 ensures that L(θ;λ, ) is at
least c∗-strongly convex. This is an essential condition for ensuring that
our objective function perturbation algorithm (Algortihm 1) is differen-
tially private. The value of ξ in Theorem 3 depends on the distribution
of the perturbation noise b. In Section 3, we analyze two different distri-
butions for the perturbation noise.
3 Distributions for the perturbation noise
Chaudhuri et al. [12] and Kifer et al. [10] showed that using perturbation
noise B2 with density function
fB2(b) ∝ exp
(
−‖b‖2
2
)
in the procedure T (λ, ;T, l, r, B2) produces -differentially private pa-
rameter estimates. In this section, we describe an efficient method for
generating such perturbation noise. Furthermore, we show that under
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slightly stronger conditions the procedure T (λ, ;T, l, r, B1) is differen-
tially private when we use perturbation noise B1 with density function
fB1(b) ∝ exp
(
−‖b‖1
2
)
,
which is simpler to generate than perturbation noise of the form B2.
Proposition 4. The random variable X = W‖W‖2Y , where W ∼ N (0, Is)
and Y ∼ χ2(2s), has density function fX(x) ∝ exp
(
−‖x‖22
)
.
Proof. See Appendix A.3. uunionsq
This result shows that B2 ∼ Ws‖Ws‖2Y2s, with Ws ∼ N (0, Is) and Y2s ∼
χ2(2s). On the other hand, B1 can be viewed as the joint distribution of
s independent Laplace random variables with mean = 0 and scale = 2. In
order to specify the stability parameter β2 in Theorem 3, we need to find
ξ ∈ R such that P (‖b‖2 ≥ ξ) ≤ δ/k. The following propositions enable us
to find ξ for the perturbation noise B1 and B2.
Proposition 5. P (‖B1‖1 ≥ 2s log(sk/δ)) ≤ δ/k.
Proof. See Lemma 17 in Chaudhuri and Vinterbo [11]. uunionsq
Proposition 6. P
(
‖B2‖2 ≥
(√
s+
√
log(k/δ)
)2
+ log(k/δ)
)
≤ δ/k.
Proof. Note that ‖B2‖2 =
∥∥∥ Ws‖Ws‖2Y2s∥∥∥2 = Y2s, where Y2s ∼ χ2(2s). The
proof is completed by invoking Lemma 1 in Laurent and Massart [13]. uunionsq
Because P (‖B1‖1 ≥ ξ) ≥ P (‖B1‖2 ≥ ξ), Proposition 5 and Propo-
sition 6 enable us to find ξ ∈ R such that P (‖b‖2 ≥ ξ) ≤ δ/k. When
the density function of b is f(b) ∝ exp
(‖b‖1
2
)
, then by Proposition 5,
ξ = 2s log(sk/δ). When the density function of b is f(b) ∝ exp
( ||b||2
2
)
,
then by Proposition 6, ξ =
(√
s+
√
log(k/δ)
)2
+ log(k/δ).
Algorithm 1 below is a reformulation of Algorithm 1 in Kifer et al.
[10], i.e., the differentially private objective function optimization algo-
rithm, and it incorporates the alternative perturbation noise. The objec-
tive function is formulated in such a way that it is compatible with the
regularization parameter selection procedure described in Theorem 3.
Theorem 7. Algorithm 1 is -differentially private.
Proof. See A.2. uunionsq
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Algorithm 1 Generalized Objective Perturbation Mechanism
Input: Dataset D = {d1, . . . , dn}; a convex domain Θ ⊂ Rs; privacy parameter ;
λ-strongly convex regularizer r; convex loss function l(θ; d) with rank-1 continuous
Hessian ∇2l(θ; d), an upper bound c on the maximal singular value of ∇2l(θ; d)
and upper bounds κj on ‖∇l(θ; d)‖j for j ∈ {1, 2} that hold for all d ∈ D and all
θ ∈ Θ. It is also required that ϕ ≥ 2κj and λ ≥ c
n(e/4−1) .
Output: A differentially-private parameter vector θ∗.
1: Sample b ∈ Rs according to noise distribution Bj , j ∈ {1, 2}.
2: return θ∗ = arg minθ L(θ;D,λ, b), where
L(θ;D,λ, b) =
1
n
∑
d∈D
l(θ; d) + r(θ) +
ϕ
n
bT θ.
3.1 Comparison of the performance of Algorithm 1 under
different noise distributions
Note that we can always upper bound ‖∇l(θ; d)‖2 by ‖∇l(θ; d)‖1 and
hence κ2 ≤ κ1 in Algorithm 1. However, as we show in this section,
results from Algorithm 1 are more accurate when sampling noise from B1
compared to B2. To compare the performance of Algorithm 1 under noise
sampled from B1 and B2, we follow the algorithm performance analysis
in Chaudhuri et al. [12] and analyze P(J(θb)− J(θ∗) > c), where
J(θ) =
1
n
∑
d∈D
l(θ; d) + r(θ)
with l and r as defined in Algorithm 1, θ∗ = arg minθ J(θ), and θb =
arg minθ
[
J(θ) + ϕnb
T θ
]
= arg minθ L(θ; b). That is, J(θb)− J(θ∗) mea-
sures how much the objective function deviates from the optimum due to
the added noise. Given random noise b ∈ Rs, J(θb) + ϕnbT θb ≤ J(θ∗) +
ϕ
nb
T θ∗. Hence, J(θb) − J(θ∗) ≤ ϕnbT (θ∗ − θb) ≤ ϕn ‖b‖2 ‖θ∗ − θb‖2. Let
E denote the event that {‖b‖2 ≤ ξ}, where ξ = nϕ
√
λc. When E holds,
then ϕnb
T θ is ϕξn -Lipschitz. Hence, with G(θ) = J(θ) λ-strongly con-
vex, g1(θ) =
ϕ
nb
T θ and g2 = 0, we can invoke Lemma 8 to obtain
‖θ∗ − θb‖2 ≤ ϕξλn . Therefore, when E holds, then
J(θb)− J(θ∗) ≤ ϕ
n
‖b‖2 ‖θ∗ − θb‖2 ≤
ϕ
n
ξ
ϕξ
λn
= c.
Thus P(J(θb) − J(θ∗) > c) ≤ 1 − P(E) = P(‖b‖2 > ξ) when the random
noise b is sampled from B1 or B2. ‖B1‖1 is the sum of s independent expo-
nential random variables with mean = 2 and thus ‖B1‖1 ∼ Gamma(s, 2).
On the other hand, ‖B2‖2 ∼ χ2(2s). But in fact χ2(2s) ∼ Gamma(s, 2).
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Therefore, P(‖B1‖2 > ξ) ≤ P(‖B1‖1 > ξ) = P(‖B2‖2 > ξ). Thus, sam-
pling the noise from B1 in Algorithm 1 produces more accurate results.
4 Application to logistic regression with elastic-net
regularization
In this section we show how to apply the results from the previous section
to penalized logistic regression. The logistic loss function l(θ;x, y) is given
by
l(θ;x, y) = log
(
1 + exp(−y θTx)) ,
where y ∈ {−1, 1}. The first and second derivatives with respect to θ are
∇l(θ;x, y) = − 1
1 + exp(y θTx)
yx
∇2l(θ;x, y) = 1
1 + exp(−y θTx)
1
1 + exp(y θTx)
xxT .
It can easily be seen that the logistic loss function satisfies the following
properties: (i) l(θ;x, y) is convex; (ii)∇2l(θ;x, y) is continuous; and (iii)
∇2l(θ;x, y) is a rank-1 matrix.
We denote by ‖M‖1 the nuclear norm of the matrix M and we choose
κ such that ‖x‖j ≤ κ for all x, where j ∈ {1, 2}. Then∥∥∇2l(θ;x, y)∥∥
1
≤ ∥∥xxT∥∥
1
= ‖x‖22 ≤ ‖x‖2j ≤ κ2, for j ∈ {1, 2},
‖∇l(θ;x, y)‖j ≤ ‖x‖j ≤ κ,
Thus we can apply Algorithm 1 to output differentially private coefficients
for logistic regression with elastic-net regularization. Moreover, the logis-
tic loss function satisfies the conditions in Theorem 3 because l(θ;x, y) is
Lipschitz: There exists a parameter θ such that
|l(θ1;x, y)− l(θ2;x, y)| ≤ ‖∇l(θ;x, y)‖2 ‖θ1 − θ2‖2 ≤ κ ‖θ1 − θ2‖2 .
Thus we can apply the stability argument in Theorem 3 to select the best
regularization parameters in a differentially private way. In Section 5 we
show how well this method performs on a GWAS data set.
5 Application to GWAS data
We now evaluate the performance of the proposed method based on a
GWAS data set. We analyze a binary phenotype such as a disease. Each
SNP can take the values 0, 1, or 2. This represents the number of mi-
nor alleles at that site. A large SNP data set is freely available from the
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HapMap project3. It consists of SNP data from 4 populations of 45 to 90
individuals each, but does not contain any phenotypic information about
the individuals. HAP-SAMPLE [14] can be used to generate SNP geno-
types for cases and controls by resampling from HapMap. This ensures
that the simulated data show linkage disequilibrium (i.e., correlations
among SNPs) and minor allele frequencies similar to real data.
For our analysis we use the simulations from Malaspinas and Uh-
ler [15]. The simulated data sets consist of 400 cases and 400 controls
each with about 10,000 SNPs per individual (SNPs were typed with the
Affymetrix CHIP on chromosome 9 and chromosome 13 of the Phase I/II
HapMap data). For each data set two SNPs with a given minor allele fre-
quency (MAF) were chosen to be causative. We will analyze the results
for minor allele frequency (MAF) = 0.25. The simulations were performed
under the multiplicative effects model: Denoting the two causative SNPs
by X and Y and the disease status by D (i.e., X,Y ∈ {0, 1, 2} and
D ∈ {−1, 1}, where 1 describes the diseased state), then the multiplica-
tive effects model can be defined through the odds of having a disease:
P(D = 1 | X,Y )
P(D = −1 | X,Y ) =  α
XβY δXY .
This model corresponds to a log-linear model with interaction between
the two SNPs. For our simulations we chose  = 0.64, α = β = 0.91 and
δ = 2.73. This results in a sample disease prevalence of 0.5 and effect size
of 1, which are typical values for association studies. See Malaspinas and
Uhler [15] for more details.
In the first step, we screen all SNPs and select a subset of SNPs with
the highest χ2-scores based on a simple χ2-test for association between
each single SNP and the phenotype. Various approaches for performing
the screening in a differentially private manner were discussed and an-
alyzed in Uhler et al. [7], Johnson and Shmatikov [8], Yu et al. [9]; We
concentrated on the second step and did not employ the differentially
private screening approaches in this paper. The second step of the two-
step procedure consists of performing penalized logistic regression with
elastic-net regularization on the selected subset of SNPs and choosing
the best regularization parameters in a differentially private manner. In
the following, we analyze the statistical utility of the second step and
show how accurately our end-to-end differentially private penalized lo-
gistic regression method is able to detect the causative SNPs and their
interaction.
3 http://hapmap.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
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The elastic-net penalty function has the form 12λ(1 − α)`2 + λα`1,
where α controls the sparsity of the resulting model and λ controls the
extent to which the elastic-net penalty affects the loss function. In the
simulation, we apply a threshold criterion to the terms in the model so
that we exclude from the model the ith term if its regression coefficient,
θi, satisfies |θi|/max
i
{|θi|} < r, where max
i
{|θi|} is the largest coefficient
in absolute value and r is a thresholding ratio, which we set to 0.01.
In our experiments, we selected M = 5 SNPs with the highest χ2-
scores, which include the two causative SNPs, for further analysis. We
denote by  the privacy budget, by α the sparsity parameter in the elastic-
net penalty function, and by “convex min” the condition of strong con-
vexity imposed on the objective function (see Theorem 3). Note that
convex min is a function of M and . For elastic-net with α fixed, we
need the smallest candidate parameter λmin ≥ convex min/(1− α).
In Figure 1, we analyze the sensitivity of our method. For different
sparsity parameters α and different privacy budgets , which determine
convex min given a fixed M , we show how often, out of 100 simulations
each, our algorithm recovered the interaction term (leftmost bar in red),
the main effects scaled by a factor of 1/2 to account for the two main
effects (middle bar in green) and all effects, i.e. the interaction effect and
the two main effects (rightmost bar in blue). As the privacy budget 
increases, the amount of noise added to the regression problem decreases,
and hence the frequency of selecting the correct effects in the regression
analysis increases. The plots also show that as the sparsity parameter α
increases, the frequency of selecting the correct terms decreases.
In Figure 2 we analyze the specificity of our method. For different spar-
sity parameters α and different strong convexity conditions convex min,
we show how often, out of 100 simulations each, our algorithm did not
include any additional effects in the selected model. As α increases, the
selected model becomes sparser and the algorithm is hence less likely to
wrongly include additional effects. We also observe that as convex min de-
creases, the specificity increases. This can be explained by how we choose
the candidate parameters λ, namely as multiples of the smallest allowed
value for λ, which is convex min/(1− α). When λ is smalll, the effect of
the penalty terms diminishes, and we are essentially performing a regular
logistic regression, which does not produce sparse models.
In Figure 3, we plotted the results of non-private penalized logistic
regression with elastic-net penalty to contrast Figure 1 and Figure 2.
The results of the non-private penalized logisitc regression is indirectly
related to  because the choice of the smallest regularization parameter
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λ is bounded below by convex min/(1− α) and convex min is a function
of . We can observe from Figure 3 that when the regularization param-
eter λ is large (i.e., convex min ≥ 1.58), the regression analysis screens
out all effects. Hence, the sensitivity is 0 and the specificity is 1. When
λ is small (i.e., convex min ≤ 0.18), the amount of regularization also
becomes marginal, and we begin to see that the sensitivity increases but
the specificity decreases. Figure 3 shows that we can identify the correct
model when α = 0.1 and convex min = 0.18. In contrast, when we use
the same α and convex min for differentially private regressions, Figure 1
shows that we can obtain a good sensitivity result, but Figure 2 shows
that the specificity result for this choice is poor.
Fig. 1: Sensitivity analysis for different sparsity parameters α, privacy budgets , and
strong convexity conditions convex min when the top 5 SNPs are used for the analysis:
the red (leftmost) bar shows how often, out of 100 simulations each, the algorithm
recovered the interaction term, the green (middle) bar corresponds to the main effects
scaled by a factor of 1/2 and the rightmost (blue) bar corresponds to all effects, i.e. 2
main effects and 1 interaction effect.
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6 Conclusions
Various papers have argued that it is possible to use aggregate genomic
data to compromise the privacy of individual-level information collected
in GWAS databases. In this paper, we respond to these attacks by propos-
ing a new method to release regression coefficients from association studies
that satisfy differential privacy and hence come with privacy guarantees
against arbitrary external information.
By extending the approaches in Chaudhuri and Vinterbo [11] and
Kifer et al. [10] we developed an end-to-end differentially private pro-
12 Fei Yu, Michal Rybar, Caroline Uhler, and Stephen E. Fienberg
Fig. 2: Specificity analysis for different sparsity parameters α and strong convexity
conditions convex min: the plot shows how often, out of 100 simulations each, our
algorithm did not include any additional effects in the selected model.
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Fig. 3: Results of non-private logistic regression with elastic-net penalty. Figure 3a
and Figure 3b would be compared with Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively.
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cedure for solving regression problems with convex penalty functions in-
cluding selecting the penalty parameters by cross-validation. We also pro-
vided the exact form of the random noise used in the objective function
perturbation mechanism and showed that the perturbation noise can be
efficiently sampled.
As a special case of a regression problem, we focused on penalized
logistic regression with elastic-net regularization, a method widely used
to perform GWAS analyses and identify disease-causing genes. Our simu-
lation results in Section 5 showed that our method is applicable to GWAS
data sets and enables us to perform data analysis that preserves privacy
and utility. The risk-utility analysis about the tradeoff between privacy
() and utility (correctly identifying the causative SNPs) helps us decide
on the appropriate level of privacy guarantee for the released data. We
hope that approaches such as those described in this paper will allow
REFERENCES 13
the release of more information from GWAS going forward and allay the
privacy concerns that others have voiced over the past decade.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 8. Let G, g1, and g2 be vector-valued continuous functions. Suppose that G is
λ-strongly convex, g1 is convex and γ1-Lipschitz, and g2 is convex and γ2-Lipschitz. If
f1 = arg minf (G+g1)(f) and f2 = arg minf (G+g2)(f), then ‖f1 − f2‖2 ≤ (γ1+γ2)/λ.
Proof (of Lemma 8). G+ g1 and G+ g2 are λ-strongly convex because G is λ-strongly
convex and g1 and g2 are convex. Then for j, k, w ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= k,
(G+ gw)(fj) ≥ (G+ gw)(fk) + ∂(G+ gw)(fk)T (fj − fk) + λ
2
||fj − fk||2
where ∂(G + gw) denotes the subgradient. We know that 0 ∈ ∂(G + gw)(fw) because
fw minimizes G+ gw. Hence,
(G+ g2)(f1) ≥ (G+ g2)(f2) + λ
2
||f1 − f2||22,
(G+ g1)(f2) ≥ (G+ g1)(f1) + λ
2
||f1 − f2||22.
By summing these two inequalities we obtain
(G+ g2)(f1) + (G+ g1)(f2) ≥ (G+ g2)(f2) + (G+ g1)(f1) + λ||f1 − f2||22
and hence [g2(f1) − g2(f2)] + [g1(f2) − g2(f1)] ≥ λ ‖f1 − f2‖22 . The fact that gw is
γw-Lipschitz implies that
∣∣∣∣g2(f1) − g2(f2)∣∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣∣g1(f2) − g2(f1)∣∣∣∣ ≤ (γ1 + γ2) ‖f1 − f2‖2
and hence
λ||f1 − f2||22 ≤ [g2(f1)− g2(f2)] + [g1(f2)− g2(f1)]
≤
∣∣∣∣g2(f1)− g2(f2)∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣g1(f2)− g2(f1)∣∣∣∣ ≤ (γ1 + γ2)||f1 − f2||2.
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Therefore ‖f1 − f2‖2 ≤ (γ1 + γ2)/λ. uunionsq
Proof (of Theorem 3). For notational convenience we assume that cmin ≥ c∗ so that
L(θ;T ) =
1
n
∑
d∈T
l(θ; d) + λT r(θ) +
ϕ
n
bT θ.
If cmin < c
∗, we can extend r to include rt+1(θ) =
max{0,c∗−cmin}
2
‖θ‖22 and extend each
λ ∈ Λ such that λt+1 = 1. First, we show that |q(θ∗(T ), V )− q(θ∗(T ′), V )| ≤ β1/n for
training sets T and T ′ that differ only by one record. Here, θ∗(T ) = arg minθ L(θ;T ).
Let d = T\T ′, d′ = T ′\T ,
G(θ;T, T ′) =
1
n
∑
d∈T∩T ′
l(θ; d) + λT r(θ) +
ϕ
n
bT θ,
g1(θ;T, T
′) =
1
n
l(θ; d) and g2(θ;T, T
′) =
1
n
l(θ; d′).
Then G is cmin-strongly convex, and g1 and g2 are convex and γ/n-Lipschitz. By
Lemma 8, ‖θ∗(T )− θ∗(T ′)‖2 ≤ 2γncmin . Since h is κ-Lipschitz we obtain for any
validation set V , |q(θ∗(T ), V )− q(θ∗(T ′), V )| ≤ 2γκ
ncmin
.
Second, we show that for all λ ∈ Λ and for all validation sets V and V ′ that
differ in a single record, |q(θ∗(T ), V ) − q(θ∗(T ′), V ′)| ≤ β2/m. Since h is non-
negative, |q(θ∗(T ), V ) − q(θ∗(T ′), V ′)| ≤ hmax/m, where hmax = supd h(θ∗(T ); d).
By definition, hmax ≤ h∗. Moreover, because h is κ-Lipschitz, hmax ≤ κ ‖θ∗(T )‖2. So
hmax ≤ min{h∗, κ ‖θ∗(T )‖2}. Now let E be the event that ‖b‖2 ≤ ξ. Provided that E
holds, we have |bT θ1 − bT θ2| ≤ ‖b‖2 ‖θ1 − θ2‖2 ≤ ξ ‖θ1 − θ2‖2 . Let G(θ) = λT r(θ),
g1(θ;T ) =
1
n
∑
d∈T l(θ; d) +
ϕ
n
bT θ, and g2(θ) = 0. Then G is cmin-strongly convex, g1
is
(
γ + ϕξ
n
)
-Lipschitz, and g2 is 0-Lipschitz. Since G + g2 is minimized when θ = 0,
we obtain by invoking Lemma 8 that ‖θ∗(T )‖2 = ‖θ∗(T )− 0‖2 ≤ 1cmin
(
γ + ϕξ
n
)
Therefore, |q(θ∗(T ), V )− q(θ∗(T ), V ′)| ≤ 1
m
min
{
h∗, κ
cmin
(
γ + ϕξ
n
)}
. uunionsq
A.2 Proof of Theorem 7
Lemma 9. If A is of full rank and E has rank at most 2, then
det(A+ E)− det(A)
det(A)
= λ1(A
−1E) + λ2(A
−1E) + λ1(A
−1E)λ2(A
−1E),
where λj(Z) denotes the j-th eigenvalue of matrix Z.
Proof (of Lemma 9). See Lemma 10 in Chaudhuri et al. [12].
Proof (of Theorem 7). Similar to the proof by Chaudhuri et al. [12], we show that if
r is infinitely differentiable, then Algorithm 1 is -differentially private. It then follows
from the successive approximation method by Kifer et al. [10] that Algorithm 1 is still
-differentially private even if r is convex but not necessarily differentiable.
Let g denote the probability density function of the algorithm’s output θ∗. Our
goal is to show that e− ≤ g(θ|D)
g(θ|D′) ≤ e. Suppose that the Hessian of r is continuous.
Because 0 = ∇L(θ;D), we have
TD(θ) := b = − 
ϕ
[∑
d∈D
∇l(θ; d) + n∇r(θ)
]
and ∇TD(θ) = − 
ϕ
[∑
d∈D
∇2l(θ; d) + n∇2r(θ)
]
.
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TD is injective because L(θ;D) is strongly convex. Also, TD is continuously differ-
entiable. Therefore,
g(θ|D)
g(θ|D′) =
f(TD(θ))
f(TD′(θ))
|det(∇TD)(θ)|
|det(∇TD′)(θ)| ,
where f is the density function of b.
We first consider | det(∇TD)(θ)|| det(∇TD′ )(θ)|
. LetA = −ϕ

∇TD′ , E = ∇2l(θ;D\D′)−∇2l(θ;D′\D).
Because l is convex and r is strongly convex, ∇TD(θ) is positive definite. Hence, A has
full rank. Also, E has rank at most 2 because ∇2l(θ; d) is a rank 1 matrix by assump-
tion. By Lemma 9,
|det(∇TD(θ))|
| det(∇TD′(θ))| =
∣∣∣∣det(A+ E)det(A)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1 + s1(A−1E) + s2(A−1E) + s1(A−1E)s2(A−1E),
where si(M) denotes the ith largest singular value of M . Because r is λ-strongly convex,
the smallest eigenvalue of A is at least nλ. So si(A
−1E) ≤ si(E)
nλ
. Because ‖∇l(θ; d)‖j ≤
κ for j ∈ {1, 2}, applying the triangle inequality to the nuclear norm yields s1(E) +
s2(E) ≤
∥∥∇2l(θ;D\D′)∥∥
1
+
∥∥∇2l(θ;D′\D)∥∥
1
≤ 2c. Therefore, s1(A−1E) s2(A−1E) ≤(
c
nλ
)2
, and
| det(∇TD)(θ)|
|det(∇TD′)(θ)| =
|det(A+ E)|
| det(A)| ≤
(
1 +
c
nλ
)2
.
Now we consider f(TD(θ))
f(TD′ (θ))
. Since
‖TD(θ)− TD′(θ)‖j =
(

ϕ
)∥∥∇l(θ;D\D′)−∇l(θ;D′\D)∥∥
j
≤
(

ϕ
)(∥∥∇l(θ;D\D′)∥∥
j
+
∥∥∇l(θ;D′\D)∥∥
j
)
≤ 2κ
ϕ
,
we obtain f(TD(θ))
f(TD′ (θ))
= exp
(
− ‖TD(θ)‖j
2
)/
exp
(
−‖TD′ (θ)‖j
2
)
≤ exp
(
κ
ϕ
)
, and there-
fore,
f(TD(θ))
f(TD′(θ))
|det(∇TD)(θ)|
|det(∇TD′)(θ)| ≤ exp
(
κ
ϕ
+ 2 log
(
1 +
c
nλ
))
≤ e.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof (of Proposition 4). The distribution of X is a special case of an s-dimensional
power exponential distribution as defined by Go´mez et al. [16], namelyX ∼ PEs(µ,Σ, β)
with µ = (0, . . . , 0)T , Σ = Ids and β =
1
2
. Go´mez et al. [16] proved that if T ∼
PEs(µ,Σ, β), then T has the same distribution as µ + Y A
TZ, where Z is a random
vector with uniform distribution on the unit sphere in Rs, Y is an absolutely continuous
non-negative random variable, independent from Z, whose density function is
g(y) =
s
Γ
(
1 + s
2β
)
2
s
2β
ys−1 exp
(
−1
2
y2β
)
I(0,∞)(y),
and A ∈ Rs×s is a square matrix such that ATA = Σ.
Note that for β = 1
2
, the distribution of Y boils down to a χ2-distribution with 2s
degrees of freedom. In addition, if W ∼ N (0, Ids), then W/||W || is uniformly distributed
on the unit s-sphere. Finally, since Σ = Ids we get that A = Id. uunionsq
